When we further looked into it, we realized it is a component of an IoT botnet targeting Fiberhome router. But it does not do the regular stuff such as DDos, Cryptojacking, Spaming, information stealing. Its’ only purpose is to setup the routers to be SSH tunneling proxy nodes. Also, unlike the typical botnets which try their best to infect as many victims as they can, this one has pretty much stopped looking for new bots after its’ active daily bot number reached low 200. It seems that the author is satisfied with the number which probably provides enough proxy service for whatever purpose he needs.
Unit 42 spent six months researching the China-based cybercrime group Rocke, which is the best-known threat actor engaged in cryptomining operations targeting the cloud. We released high-level results from our investigation of Rocke in our recent cloud threat report. This research report provides a deep dive into our investigation of Rocke, which concluded that the group is able to conduct operations with little interference and limited detection risk.
SystemBC is a previously undocumented malware that we have recently observed as a payload in both RIG and Fallout exploit kit (EK) campaigns. While EK activity has remained quite low relative to its peak in early 2016, exploit kits remain important vectors for malware distribution, particularly in regions where Windows piracy is common. The new malware utilizes SOCKS5 proxies to mask network traffic to and from Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure using secure HTTP connections for well-known banking Trojans such as Danabot, which we have also observed distributed in the same EK campaigns.
This new ransomware was discovered by Michael Gillespie on 8 February 2019 and it is still improving over time. This blog will explain the technical details and share information about how this new ransomware family is working. There are some variants of the Clop ransomware but in this report, we will focus on the main version and highlight part of those variations. The main goal of Clop is to encrypt all files in an enterprise and request a payment to receive a decryptor to decrypt all the affected files. To achieve this, we observed some new techniques being used by the author that we have not seen before. Clearly over the last few months we have seen more innovative techniques appearing in ransomware.
At the end of 2017, a group of researchers from ESET’s Prague malware lab decided to take a deeper look at the infamous Delphi-written banking trojans that are known to target Brazil. We extended our focus to other parts of Latin America (such as Mexico and Chile) soon after as we noticed many of these banking trojans target those countries as well. Our main goal was to discover whether there is a way to classify these banking trojans and to learn more about their behavior in general.
After two years of decline in Android ransomware, a new family has emerged. ESET has seen the ransomware, detected by ESET Mobile Security as Android/Filecoder.C, distributed via various online forums. Using victims’ contact lists, it spreads further via SMS with malicious links. Due to narrow targeting and flaws in both execution of the campaign and implementation of its encryption, the impact of this new ransomware is limited. However, if the developers fix the flaws and the operators start targeting broader groups of users, the Android/Filecoder.C ransomware could become a serious threat.
Since the lull in Emotet activity at the beginning of June 2019 and AZORult, Dridex and ransomware campaigns have become more prominent. In July 2019 we observed a phishing campaign delivering the Dridex banking Trojan. The payload was isolated by Bromium Secure Platform and captured the malware, which helped us to analyse its infection chain and to understand how the attack worked. In this blog post, we go through the stages of its infection chain to showcase how Dridex uses five code injection techniques to masquerade itself as legitimate Windows processes (MITRE ATT&CK technique T1036) to avoid detection.
In the past months Yoroi published a white paper exploring the risks that users can encounter when downloading materials from P2P sharing network, such as the Torrent one. Yoroi discussed how crooks easily lure their victims to download malware along with the desired content. Recently, our threat monitoring operations pointed us to an interesting file named “Lucio Dalla Discografia Completa”: this file pretends to be a collection of the discography of a famous italian singer, but it actually hides malicious intents.
Elasticsearch is no stranger to cybercriminal abuse given its popularity and use to organizations. In fact, this year’s first quarter saw a surge of attacks — whether by exploiting vulnerabilities or taking advantage of security gaps — leveled against Elasticsearch servers. These attacks mostly delivered cryptocurrency-mining malware, as in the case of one attack we saw last year. The latest attack we spotted deviates from the usual profit-driven motive by delivering backdoors as its payload. These threats can turn affected targets into botnet zombies used in distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
BrushaLoader is one of a growing group of downloaders frequently employed by threat actors to profile infected PCs and then load more robust payloads on devices of interest. Malware like BrushaLoader contributes to the ongoing trend of “quality over quantity” infections and enables threat actors to better stay under the radar than they can with highly disruptive infections like ransomware or when distributing massive malicious spam campaigns with high-profile malware as their primary payload. At the same time, these loaders can also deliver those same disruptive infections if threat actors choose to load ransomware as secondary payloads, a scenario ProofPoint have observed on multiple occasions recently.
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