While summer is usually synonymous with vacations, it seems that the Sednit group has been developing new components to add to the Zebrocy malware family. The Sednit group – also known as APT28, Fancy Bear, Sofacy or STRONTIUM – has been operating since at least 2004 and has made headlines frequently in recent years. On August 20th, 2019, a new campaign was launched by the group targeting their usual victims – embassies of, and Ministries of Foreign Affairs in, Eastern European and Central Asian countries.
We previously reported on how we managed to temporarily shut down 15 operative QNAPCrypt ransomware campaigns targeting Linux-based file storage systems (NAS servers). We have now identified a new QNAPCrypt sample which is being used by the same threat actor group. The authors behind this new ransomware instance have revealed enough evidence for us to conclude the establishment of FullofDeep, a Russian cybercrime group operating from the Union State and the Ukraine. The group is mainly focused on ransomware campaigns.
Between May and June 2019, Unit 42 observed previously unknown tools used in the targeting of transportation and shipping organizations based in Kuwait. The first known attack in this campaign targeted a Kuwait transportation and shipping company in which the actors installed a backdoor tool named Hisoka. Several custom tools were later downloaded to the system in order to carry out post-exploitation activities. All of these tools appear to have been created by the same developer. We were able to collect several variations of these tools including one dating back to July 2018.
Early in August, Proofpoint described what appeared to be state-sponsored activity targeting the US utilities sector with malware that Proofpoint dubbed “Lookback” . Between August 21 and August 29, 2019, several spear phishing emails were identified targeting additional US companies in the utilities sector. The phishing emails originated from what appears to be an actor-controlled domain: globalenergycertification[.]net. This domain, like those used in previous campaigns, impersonated a licensing body related to the utilities sector. In this case, it masqueraded as the legitimate domain for Global Energy Certification (“GEC”). The emails include a GEC examination-themed body and a malicious Microsoft Word attachment that uses macros to install and run LookBack.
Unlike in the pre-internet era, when trading in the stock or commodities market involved a phone call to a broker — a move which often meant additional fees for would-be traders — the rise of trading apps placed the ability to trade in the hands of ordinary users. However, their popularity has led to their abuse by cybercriminals who create fake trading apps as lures for unsuspecting victims to steal their personal data. We recently found and analyzed an example of such an app, which had a malicious malware variant that disguised itself as a legitimate Mac-based trading app called Stockfolio.
FortiGuard Labs was investigating the Sodinokibi ransomware family, when we came across the newly discovered Nemty Ransomware. Interestingly, as we analyzed this new malware, we also encountered an artifact embedded in its binary that we were very much familiar with since it was also used by the GandCrab ransomware before the threat actors’ announced retirement. It is also interesting to see that the Nemty ransomware is being distributed using the same method as Sodinokibi, a malware that has strong similarities to GandCrab.
Thus far in 2019, the Cybereason Nocturnus team has encountered several variants of the trojan Glupteba. Glupteba was first spotted in 2011 as a malicious proxy generating spam and click-fraud traffic from a compromised machine. Since then, it has been distributed through several different methods and used in multiple attacks, including Operation Windigo until 2018. The majority of Glupteba’s history has revolved around Operation Windigo, though over the years the malware has matured significantly to be part of its own botnet and distributed via Adware.
The story of how we conquered WiryJMPer’s obfuscation begins with a simple binary file posing as an ABBC Coin wallet. We found the file suspicious, as the file size was three-times as big as it should be, and the strings in the file corresponded to other software WinBin2Iso (version 3.16) from SoftwareOK. ABBC Coin (originally Alibaba Coin, not affiliated with Alibaba Group) is an altcoin, one of many blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. WinBin2Iso, on the other hand, is software that converts various binary images of CD/DVD/Blu-ray media into the ISO format. Behavioral analysis revealed that the binary, posing as an ABBC Coin wallet, is a dropper, which we will, from now on, refer to as WiryJMPer. WiryJMPer hides a Netwire payload between two benign binaries.
While we observed multiple iterations of this lure, metadata shows that the original document was created by a speaker at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit and then modified by the threat actors. The content of this lure suggests that it was likely targeted towards conference attendees and/or others who had an interest in what took place at the conference. This particular document was previously referenced in a report by ESTSecurity, and its embedded domain was included in a report by the Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (ANSSI). This indicates that the Autumn Aperture campaign was likely a continuation of a previously reported activity from this threat group.
We recently caught a malvertising attack distributing the malware Glupteba. This is an older malware that was previously connected to a campaign named Operation Windigo and distributed through exploit kits to Windows users. In 2018, a security company reported that the Glupteba botnet may have been independent from Operation Windigo and had moved to a pay-per-install adware service to distribute it in the wild. The activities of the actors behind Glupteba have been varied: they were suspected of providing proxy services in the underground, and were identified as using the EternalBlue exploit to move into local networks and run Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency miners.
Our Standard Office Hours
Monday – Friday: 8:00AM – 5:00PM EDT
Saturday – Sunday: Closed
Where to Find Us
Data Privacy Notice
- – All product names, logos, and brands are property of their respective owners.
- – The use of these names, logos, and brands is for identification purposes only and does not imply endorsement.
- – Content syndication and aggregation of public information is solely for the purpose of identifying information security trends, all syndicated content contains source links to the content creator website. All content is owned by it’s respective content creators.
- – If you are an owner of some content and want it to be removed, please email firstname.lastname@example.org